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Abstract
A large empirical literature has shown that user fees significantly deter public service utilization in 
developing countries. While most of these results reflect partial equilibrium analysis, we find that 
the nationwide abolition of public school fees in Kenya in 2003 led to no increase in net public 
enrollment rates, but rather a dramatic shift toward private schooling. Results suggest this divergence 
between partial- and general-equilibrium effects is partially explained by social interactions: the entry 
of poorer pupils into free education contributed to the exit of their more affluent peers.
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A recent wave of randomised trials in developing countries has shown demand
for public services to be highly price elastic, with even low user fees dramati-
cally reducing utilisation (Michael Kremer & Alaka Holla 2009). Critics have
questioned the relevance of these partial-equilibrium exercises for policymaking,
on the grounds that they ignore potential general equilibrium eects (Daron
Acemoglu 2010). In the education context, a large literature on school segrega-
tion and sorting has shown that relatively privileged parents may seek to disasso-
ciate themselves from marginal social groups (Thomas J. Nechyba 2006, Sarah
Reber 2011). In this paper we explore whether these social interactions generate
general equilibrium eects which might obscure or reverse the downward-sloping
demand curves anticipated by partial equilibrium analysis of fee abolition.
In January 2003, the Kenyan government announced the abolition of all school
fees in public primary schools. We estimate the eect of this nationwide reform
by comparing public and private schools at primary and secondary level, before
and after the reform { analogous to a triple-dierences estimator.
Conrming anecdotal reports by James Tooley (2009) we nd that FPE was
an ineective tool to increase school participation. Instead, net enrollment in
government primary schools remained unchanged over the ten-year period from
1997 to 2006. Meanwhile, both net enrollment and fee rates in private schools
more than doubled.
We interpret this perverse demand response to a fall in price as prima facie
evidence that FPE led to a (perceived) decline in public school quality. There
are at least three potential mechanisms that may explain this shift in perceived
quality, all of which would result only from a price decrease aecting a large
number of children and might elude detection in small-scale experiments: (i)
an inux of new students and concomitant deterioration in the composition of
pupils; (ii) a change in underlying school productivity or value added, possibly
due to a change in the accountability framework under free service provision;
and (iii) changes in overall nancial resources due to lost fee revenue. By
linking FPE to reduced school quality each of these mechanisms may obscure
the downward-sloping demand curves predicted by partial equilibrium analysis.
Our core empirical model in Section 5 focuses on the response of enrollment
to the rst channel, testing whether pupils who exited public school did so in
response to new entrants. To overcome the observational equivalence of local
spillover and unobserved school quality eects (cf. G Ellison & E Glaeser 1997),
we follow Patrick Bayer & Christopher Timmins (2007) in using exogenous char-
1acteristics of schooling options not chosen { in our application the test scores of
nearby private schools for children enrolled in government school and vice versa
{ as an instrument. Under the assumption of `no quality spillovers' between
schools, these attributes will drive enrollment choices but be uncorrelated with
unobserved school quality.
The results of this enrollment choice model suggest that the exit of auent
pupils in response to marginal entrants was suciently large to explain the
entire shift in demand (and perceived school quality) under FPE in favor of
private schools.
This result is corroborated by simple descriptive statistics in Section 4 showing
that public school funding did not decline under FPE as lost fee revenue was
more than oset by new central-government grants. While we present no di-
rect measures of school value-added or the second channel listed above, it is
noteworthy that our empirical model is able to explain the paradoxical shifts in
enrollment without recourse to the hypothesis of declining school value-added.
Our paper relates to a recent literature from eld experiments in developing
countries which have established signicantly negative price-elasticities of de-
mand (David Evans, Michael Kremer & Muthoni Ngatia 2009, Jessica Cohen &
Pascaline Dupas 2010, Nava Ashraf, James Berry & Jesse Shapiro 2010). These
same studies have shown that free provision presents few trade-os in terms of
allocative eciency or psychological eects on \ownership" that may encour-
age recipients to make better use of a costly product. Relating this to FPE in
Kenya, we argue that stable public enrollment rates are consistent with a neg-
ative price-elasticity of demand. Similarly we nd no evidence of direct eects
of free provision on school value-added as one might associate with eciency
or ownership channels.
A separate literature has examined large-scale reforms to user fees in educa-
tion. Results mainly suggest a positive eect on school enrollment as a whole,
though our evidence suggests these results may obscure important dierences in
the role of public and private schools in these reforms. Klaus Deininger (2003)
shows that the introduction of free schooling in Uganda was associated with a
large increase in enrollment when aggregating both public and private schools.1
Positive enrollment eects from fee abolition are also documented for Colombia
(Felipe Barrera-Osorio, Leigh L. Linden & Miguel Urquiola 2007) and Cambo-
dia (Maria Cheung, Andreas Madestam & Jakob Svensson 2011), again without
1Free provision in Uganda also appears to be have been progressive, with poorer households
more likely to take advantage of free schools { a nding conrmed in our results below and
by Milu Charles Muyanga, John Olwande, Esther Mueni & Stella Wambugu (2010) using a
dierent data set than ours for Kenya.
2distinguishing the role of public and private schools. Also worth noting is that
the large eects on school enrollment documented under conditional cash trans-
fer programs such as PROGRESA in Mexico (T. Paul Schultz 2004) correspond
to a change in the opportunity cost of both public and private schools.
The ndings here for Kenya are novel in that we focus on fee abolition that
was exclusive to public schools, but nd that this reform did not signicantly
raise public enrollment. To our knowledge, ours is the rst study to note a link
from free public education to the emergence of private schools. While we focus
on enrollment here, the explanation we provide for why FPE did not lead to a
signicant increase in net public enrollment is consistent with recent research on
standardised test scores in Kenya. First, our evidence suggests reduced demand
for public schools was driven by auent ight from marginal peers, rather than
reduced school value added. In line with this, Adrienne Lucas & Isaac Mbiti
(2011) also examine the Kenyan experience and nd a small, negative eect of
FPE on test scores in public schools that appears to be driven by changes in pupil
composition. Second, enrollment choices in favor of private schools appear to
be driven by demand for quality education. Consistent with this nding, Tessa
Bold, Mwangi Kimenyi, Germano Mwabu & Justin Sandefur (2011) nd a large,
causal test-score gap between Kenyan public and private schools.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Policy background
Prior to the introduction of FPE, non-salary expenditure for schools was ob-
tained through events known as harambee, which aimed to raise nancial and
in-kind contributions for education and development from local communities.
While in principle voluntary, in practice children whose parents had not made
any harambee contributions were suspended from school (Mary Kay Gugerty &
Edward Miguel 2005).
Under the FPE policy, government primary schools previously responsible for
raising funds locally to pay for classroom maintenance, desks, books and other
non-salary expenditures, are prohibited from collecting revenue. Instead, each
school now receives a central government grant twice per year to cover these
non-salary costs.
In contrast to the changes that occurred in the nancing of non-salary education
expenditure, the system of teacher employment and local school governance
has remained the same. All teachers are centrally recruited, hired and red,
3assigned and reassigned and paid by the Teacher Service Commission, a sub-
sidiary of the Ministry of Education located in Nairobi. At the local level, school
management committees, consisting of parents, the head teacher, and district
education board ocials, have ocial governing authority for each school.
2.2 Data
We draw on two broad types of data: household survey data, which underlies
the core of our analysis, and school-level administrative data. Both data sets
span the period before and after the enactment of FPE.
2.2.1 Household survey data
The analysis of education expenditure and enrollment is based on two consecu-
tive, nationally-representative, cross-sectional, household surveys conducted by
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. The rst is the 1997 Welfare Monitor-
ing Survey (WMS), which includes a sample of 10,874 households { including
13,639 children of primary-school age { interviewed roughly ve years prior to
the introduction of FPE. The second round of data is taken from the 2006
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS), spanning 13,212 house-
holds (with 14,610 children of primary-school age), interviewed three academic
years after FPE had been implemented.
These data sets are well-suited to our needs in that they include comparable
modules on school enrollment from before and after the onset of FPE, dis-
tinguishing between public and private school attendance. Use of integrated
household surveys with detailed consumption and expenditure information al-
lows us to highlight changes in the socioeconomic composition of public and
private school enrollment over this period. In addition, specic questions on
education expenditure provide the basis for examining pre-reform variation in
government school fees and secular changes in the equilibrium price of private
schools. The clustered nature of the household survey samples { providing in-
formation on multiple households in the catchment area of a given public or
private school { is central to our empirical strategy to estimate social interac-
tion eects, including the impact of school crowding on the incentive to send
one's child to a government or private school.
42.2.2 School-level administrative data
We use test-score data from the Kenya Certicate of Primary Education (KCPE)
exam as a proxy for school quality. The KCPE exam is standardised nationwide,
administered at the end of primary school by the Kenya National Examination
Council, and covers English, Kiswahili, math, science and history. The art and
business exams introduced in 2001 are excluded here to maintain comparability
over time. Our combined test-score data set constitutes a panel of all public
and private primary schools in Kenya, for each year from 1998 to 2006.
Because we use the test scores as one determinant of school choice, we seek
to construct a proxy of the quality of all public and private schools available to
a given pupil. We use administrative districts as a conservative proxy of this
choice set and collapse test scores to district averages, separately for public and
private schools. The household survey data and administrative test-score data
are matched at the district level for use in the enrollment model below.
3 Enrollment and expenditure changes since FPE
In this section, we document the eect of FPE on school enrollment and expen-
diture. Because the FPE reform was instituted simultaneously nationwide, we
base our inferences about the eect of FPE on a comparison of the trajectories
of enrollment and expenditure across two dimensions: public versus private pri-
mary schools, and primary versus secondary schools. We begin by laying out the
basic empirical facts and conclude the section with a discussion of what these
facts imply about shifts in demand and the perceived quality of public primary
schools under FPE.
3.1 Enrollment patterns
Did the abolition of fees lead to an increase in primary public enrollment? The
top panel of Figure 1 shows net enrollment rates for public and private primary
schools before and after FPE. Contrary to expectations, FPE was not associated
with an increase enrollment in public primary schools. In fact, net enrollment
in public primary schools was essentially unchanged over the ten-year period
spanning the onset of FPE. Instead, it was the private sector that saw a large
inux of students { nearly tripling in size between 1997 and 2006.
For comparison purposes, we also plot changes in the net enrollment rate in the


















Figure 1: Net enrollment rates, by sector, before and after FPE, based on
household survey data (WMS & KIHBS)
6in the secondary sector throughout the period, this serves as a control group
of sorts. In contrast to the primary sector, net enrollment in both the public
and private system increased. The fact that the majority of the increase in
secondary private enrollment is explained by the general trend in secondary
enrollment, gives us some condence that it was FPE, and not other factors,
which introduced a unique wedge between public and private enrollment in the
primary sector.
Table 1 presents gross and net enrollment rates in public and private schools
before and after FPE disaggregated by parental education. The disaggregated
numbers show that the negligible growth in aggregate enrollment masks sub-
stantial movement in and out of public primary schooling. enrollment of less
educated households (primary education or less) in the public sector increased
signicantly, whereas more educated households left the public sector. Con-
versely, increases in enrollment in the private sector were largely concentrated
among the well-educated. That is, FPE broadened access to primary schooling
on the one hand, while contributing to increased segregation between public
and private primary schools on the other.
3.2 Expenditure patterns
Next, we examine the price eect of the introduction of FPE. In other words,
did FPE successfully reduce the cost of schooling for children enrolled in public
primary school, and how did fees in private schools respond? To examine this
question, we simply look at household expenditure on education before and
after FPE, distinguishing between fees and other expenditure, and contrasting
the public and private system. We estimate these costs as follows
Expit = p0Priit + p1(Priit  FPE) (1)
+ s0Secit + s1(Secit  FPE) + uit
where Expit is a measure of the education expenditure for household i in period
t, Priit and Secit measure the number of household members enrolled in primary
and secondary education respectively. Note that equation (1) contains no con-
stant and the dummy variable for FPE is only included as an interaction term.
Thus the p0 and s0 can be read directly as the average level of spending per































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Columns (1) and (2) of Table (2) show the composition of real annual household
expenditure on private and public primary schooling both before and after FPE.
The main result to take away from Table 1 is that per-pupil expenditure on
public primary schooling has eectively halved since the introduction of FPE
and the expenditure on fees has eectively gone to zero, while the expenditure
on private primary schooling per pupil has more than doubled in the same time
span. All these eects are signicant at the 1% level. Therefore the introduction
of FPE has had the expected price eect. Combined with the enrollment trends
since FPE, this implies that aggregate expenditure on public schooling has fallen,
while total expenditure on private schooling has increased.
For comparison purposes, columns (3) and (4) report the results from the same
analysis applied to expenditure on secondary education. Since secondary educa-
tion was funded by parental fees during the entire period, this can be regarded
as a placebo experiment. As can be seen from column (3) and (4), expendi-
ture on secondary education is high, but the relative dierence between private
and public expenditure is much smaller than in the primary sector both before
and after the introduction of FPE. Moreover, total expenditure on secondary
schooling has dropped in both sectors over the period (by 20% in terms of total
expenditure and by 50% in terms of fees in the public sector. Expenditure in the
private sector has also dropped, although the eect is not signicant). Hence,
it is not the case that we are merely observing an overall increase in demand
and thus price for private schooling. Rather, this increase is restricted to the
primary sector, which has been subject to FPE.
3.3 Inferring school quality from changes in quality and price
The shifts in enrollment and fee levels documented above provide clues about
changes in school quality under FPE.
Consider the anticipated eects of free primary education on public and pri-
vate primary school enrollment in a simple supply and demand model. Assume
the following: households choose between government and private schools; an
individual child must be enrolled in either one system or the other; demand
curves are downward-sloping and supply curves upward-sloping for both public
and private education.
Now consider the anticipated eect of the introduction of free primary educa-
tion within this model. Fee abolition yields a perfectly elastic supply curve for
government schools at zero price. Enrollment in public school increases and
private enrollment falls. This decline in demand for private schooling would
9Table 2: Household educational expenditure
Exp. on Primary Exp. on Secondary
All Fees All Fees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kids in pub. prim. 638.24 217.15
(19.69) (14.50)
Kids in priv. prim. 3592.08 2440.98
(640.44) (574.23)
FPE  Kids in pub. prim. -297.09 -197.30
(26.63) (19.32)
FPE  Kids in priv. prim. 4325.59 2642.72
(962.48) (822.85)
Kids in pub. sec. 10192.02 7496.12
(501.25) (459.64)
Kids in priv. sec. 15933.68 13289.38
(4419.98) (4268.23)
FPE  Kids in pub. sec. -1984.66 -3659.26
(600.33) (496.41)
FPE  Kids in priv. sec. -215.22 -3234.19
(5242.75) (4849.94)
Obs. 17,238 17,238 17,238 17,238
The dependent variable is total annual household educational expenditure in 1997 Kenyan
Shillings. (1 USD  KES 54 circa June, 1997.) In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable
includes only expenditure on primary education, and in columns 3 and 4 only on secondary
education. Columns 1 and 3 include all categories of educational expenditure available in both
surveys (i.e., fees, books, uniforms, board, and transport) for the relevant education level.
Columns 2 and 4 are restricted to fees only. The FPE variable takes a value of one in 2006
and zero in 1997. Independent variables labeled \Children in ..." measure the total number
of children in the household enrolled in a given type of school. The sample is restricted to
households that have at least one child in either primary or secondary school. Numbers in
parentheses report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
10reduce the equilibrium price of private schools.
The actual shifts in enrollment and fees observed in the data are quite opposite
to these predictions. In the public system, the quantity demanded remained un-
changed in response to a price decrease { with some socio-economic groups even
decreasing their demand, while in the private system both prices and quantities
increased dramatically. This constellation of price and quantity shifts can be
entirely explained by a sharp downward shift in the demand for public schooling
and an increase in the demand for private schooling after FPE.
We take this apparent shift in demand as prima facie evidence that the (per-
ceived) quality of public primary education declined under FPE. To corroborate
this evidence, in the following sections we explore possible mechanisms that
might link FPE to reduced school quality.
4 Funding
The rst potential mechanism linking FPE to school quality noted in the intro-
duction was a change in physical, nancial or human resources within schools.
A reduction in per-pupil resources in public primary schools after FPE could pro-
duce a decline in perceived school quality and, in turn, explain the failure of net
enrollment to respond to a price decrease. This section attempts a reckoning
of the net changes in school resources under FPE, combining household data
sources on parental contributions with ocial government data on capitation
grants and pupil-teacher ratios.
4.1 Financial resources
The fundamental shift in school nance under the FPE reform was the replace-
ment of school fees with a central government grant. On average, did these
grants fully compensate for the lost fee revenue?
The FPE grants were equivalent to approximately $14 USD per child per annum,
deposited in local bank accounts for each school (Gene Sperling 2008). The
accounts were to be administered by \school management committees", chaired
by the head teacher and including parent representatives. Despite measures to
prevent graft inspired in part by the Ugandan experience (Ritva Reinikka &
Jakob Svensson 2004), an external audit of the FPE funds commissioned by the
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of per pupil funding (fees plus grants)
in public primary schools, before and after FPE.
12Actual funds received fell short of the legislated amount in each year audited by
approximately 5 to 15% (Andrew Teyie & Henry Wanyama 2010).
Despite this leakage, comparing these audit reports to the pre-FPE gures on
public school fees from the household survey data in Section 4, on average the
loss in fee revenue was more than oset by the rise in public expenditure through
capitation grants. Figure 2 shows the distribution of average nancial resources
per pupil across Kenyan districts before and after FPE. The unit of observation
is a pupil. Per pupil funding in 1997 consists solely of fee revenue, whereas in
2006 it includes fee revenue plus the capitation grant. As seen in the graph,
FPE implied a collapse in the variance of the funding distribution. Whereas
the 1997 distribution spans the range from zero to $400 per annum, the 2006
distribution has a lower bound at the amount of the capitation grant, roughly
$6 per pupil after leakage. This six-dollar gure represents roughly the 80th
percentile of the 1997 funding distribution, indicating that the vast majority of
public-school pupils experienced an increase in funding levels.
4.2 Human resources
In addition to the capitation grants, the key resource provided to public schools
by the central government is teaching sta.
Gross enrollment gures for public schools based on the household survey data
(discussed in detail below in section 5) rose from 99.9% to 103.5% from 1997
to 2006. Adjusting for population growth, this implies that the total number of
pupils in public primary schools rose from 6.63 million in 1997 to 7.56 million
in 2006. Unfortunately, data on teacher employment is not available for the
same starting point, but administrative records from the Teacher Service Com-
mission show that the total number of teachers employed by the government
rose from 133,927 in 2002 { just before the onset of FPE { to 148,845 in 2006.
Extrapolating this hiring rate back to 1997 implies a total teacher count of
117,364. Combining these gures yields a total pupil-teacher ratio for Kenyan
public schools that fell during the 10-year period spanning FPE from 56 pupils
in 1997 to just under 51 in 2006.
To summarise, for 80% of primary schools, the loss of fee revenue from FPE
was more than compensated by capitation grants. Furthermore, despite the
fact that gross enrollment rates rose slightly under FPE, teacher hiring more
than kept pace with this increase. Both the nancial and human resources
available to public schools increased per pupil under FPE. Thus we turn to
alternative channels to explain the perceived decline in public school quality
13after the abolition of fees.
5 Modeling the enrollment choice
The introduction outlined three avenues by which FPE can aect the quality
of schooling and therefore the demand for public versus private school: (i)
enrollment decisions of peers, which help determine both expected class size as
well as the `quality' of peers in a given school, (ii) the underlying quality of
the school, capturing the eect of local accountability, unobserved managerial
talent, teaching ability, etc., and (iii) school nances. We discussed the third
channel in Section 4. In this section, we examine the roles of class size and peer
composition in the decision to enrol in a particular school sector.
We test whether the shift out of public and into private enrollment is explained
by social-interaction eects in enrollment. If a large portion of this shift is
explained by an adverse reaction to the inux of marginal pupils into public
schools, we will interpret this as evidence that the divergence between partial
and general equilibrium price elasticities is largely accounted for by composi-
tional eects. On the other hand, failure to nd statistically and economically
signicant social-interaction eects will leave the door open to alternative expla-
nations, including a deterioration in public school value-added after the abolition
of fees.
In the rest of this section, we analyze the choice between public, private and no
enrollment in a multinomial discrete choice framework and show that the shifts
in demand for public and private schooling can be explained almost entirely by
changes in class size and the composition of students. In other words, the inux
of marginal students documented in the previous section is what caused more
auent students to decrease their demand for public schooling. By accounting
for shifts in the demand curve, our results explain how a constant aggregate
enrollment rate in response to a price drop is consistent with downward-sloping
individual demand curves.
5.1 Model
We begin by laying out a simple model of enrollment. Households indexed by i,
maximise utility by choosing between three schooling options j = fN;G;Pg, i.e.
not enrolling (N), attending a government school, (G), or attending a private
14school (P) in schooling market m = 1;:::M pre- and post-FPE t = 0;1.2 Utility
is an increasing function of the education acquired, adjusted for quality, subject
to the constraint that the cost of education is less than disposable income.
The quality of education in turn is decreasing in class size and increasing in
the average quality of peers in a given school, which allows for (either positive
or negative) enrollment spillovers in a given schooling market m. Households
choose the schooling option that yields the highest utility.









Utility depends on: (1) observable school quality, Xm
j;t, which is proxied by
exam performance in public and private schools in the district; (2) the share of
`marginal' children enrolling in the same school type, m
j;t, which is proxied by
the share of children from the 25% least educated households, and (3) a set of
individual socio-economic characteristics Zi, in particular log food consumption
and the years of education of the household head, which reect household's
preferences for education option j in market m as well as their ability to aord
it pre-and post FPE. All other school level variables that may aect parental
enrollment choices are captured by a choice-specic unobservable m
j;t. In this
context, the most obvious unobservables are the price and value added of the
nearby government and/or private primary school. The random component "mt
ij
captures the remaining idiosyncratic heterogeneity in preferences.











The rst step of this procedure consists of estimating the probability that a
household enrols in a particular school sector as a function of the individual
specic regressors as well as a district-sector-time specic xed eect. In the
second step, we estimate how this xed value of enrolling in a particular sector
is aected by changes in observable school-level attributes and the enrollment
behaviour of others.
Estimating the probability that school sector j yields the highest utility to house-
hold i is a standard multinomial discrete choice problem (A. Colin Cameron &
2It makes sense to model the enrollment decision as taking place in many separate markets,
in this case a district, since pupils in Kenya in reality choose among a small number of primary
schools in their immediate vicinity.
15Pravin K. Trivedi 2005). Assuming that the errors "m
ij in (3) are iid type I ex-
treme value yields a mixed logit model for the probability of choosing a particular
school option as a function of the regressors:









This model combines features of a conditional and a multinomial logit model,
which allows estimation of both school-sector and individual-specic eects
(Jerey M. Wooldridge 2001).
Having estimated the sector-district-time xed eects  in the rst step, the
second-step (4) consists simply of a linear regression of the predicted value of
enrolling in particular school sector on its various determinants. The goal here
is to separate the eect of (positive or negative) spillovers in enrollment  from
the unobserved residual demand for a particular school type m
j;t.
5.2 Identifying social interactions in enrollment decisions
In trying to identify the local spillover eect  in (4), we are confronted with the
problem that local spillovers cannot readily be distinguished from unobserved
group eects (Lawrence Blume & Steven Durlauf 2005). To paraphrase Ellison
& Glaeser's (1997) `equivalence theorem' regarding identication of spillovers
in an industrial organization context, \the relationship between mean mea-
sured levels of [enrollment] and [school] characteristics is the same regardless of
whether [enrollment] is the result of [spillovers], [unobserved school characteris-
tics], or a combination of the two." That is, any increase in unobserved school
quality will mechanically increase enrollment and therefore the enrollment shares
of peers regardless of whether social interactions are present or not { making a
separate identication of  and m
j;t impossible unless a valid instrument exists.
The characteristics of a valid instrument in this context are that it be correlated
with the number of pupils who choose a given school, but not correlated with
the unobserved xed attributes of that school. Bayer & Timmins (2007) propose
a novel strategy to identify social interaction eects by using variation in the
underlying choice set of individual agents. This strategy is particularly suited
for applications meeting two conditions. First, data are available on a large
number of agents endogenously sorting into a xed set of categories; in our
application this involves choosing between government schools, private schools,
or not enrolling. Second, data are ideally required on many distinct markets
where such sorting occurs; in our application, a market is dened as a district,
16on the assumption that pupils or their parents do not shop for primary schools
outside the district where they reside.
The strategy proposed by Bayer & Timmins (2007) relies on the \internal logic
of the choice process itself". The exogenous characteristics of the schooling op-
tions not chosen by a given individual { e.g., the characteristics of nearby private
schools for students in public school, and vice versa { will provide the content
for an instrument under the assumption that there are no quality spillovers be-
tween schools. In that case the attributes of the schooling options that were
not chosen in each market will contain information that predicts enrollment de-
cisions of an individual's peers, but do not aect the value parents derive from
their chosen school sector.3
Following this line of reasoning, any non-linear function of the exogenous char-
acteristics of close-by alternatives to the chosen school type would qualify as a
valid instrument. The optimal instrument in this context simply uses the dis-
crete choice model laid out above to predict individual enrollment choices as a
function of exogenous individual and alternative-specic characteristics and then
averages over all individuals in a market and sector. Specically, we construct













Close inspection of equation (6) reveals the manner by which eective choice
set variation `switches on' the instrument. If there was only one market (i.e.
the whole of Kenya) in which individuals choose to enrol, then the denominator
of (6) is a constant. Hence, identication would rely exclusively on the non-
linear transformation of Xm
j;t0
0 and is sensitive to misspecication of the utility
function and/or error distribution in (3). In contrast, if enrollment choices take
place in many distinct markets, the denominator of (6) varies across m. In
this case, identication is driven by variation in the excluded instruments { not
specic functional form assumptions. Simply put: the more choice set variation,
the more robust the identication strategy.
The second-stage of the estimation is a simple linear regression with a non-linear
3In our view the assumption of `no-spillovers' is a valid rst-order approximation to the
production of school value. In any case, the instrumentation strategy remains valid even in
the case of `value' spillovers, as long as the set of locations that directly aect the utility an
agent derives from his choice is a subset of the location-specic characteristics he considers
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j;t + m
j;t (7)
Identifying the local spillover eect  will enable us to estimate the extent to
which local spillover eects in enrollment counteract the price eect of FPE.
5.3 Results
The results from the rst step of the estimation procedure are given in Table
3, where we predict the probability of enrolling in public school, private school
or not at all as a function of household socio-economic indicators and a set of
district-sector-time dummies.
Column (1) presents the results for primary enrollment choices. The reported
eects are equivalent to marginal eects in a standard multinomial logit esti-
mation.5 As anticipated, following FPE, parental education and income are less
important in predicting enrollment in public primary school. For the pre-FPE
period, there is a positive, and signicant association between the household
head's education and the child's probability of enrollment in government pri-
mary school: every additional year of education increased the probability of
public school enrollment by 0.8%. Following FPE, this eect was completely
reversed. The results for log-food expenditure are qualitatively similar. Prior
to FPE, every one unit increase in log food expenditure increased the proba-
bility of attending public school by 1.2%. Following FPE, this eect was more
than oset by the signicant, negative coecient on the interaction of log food
expenditure and the FPE indicator. In the private sector, there was already
a signicant relationship between a household's socio-economic standing and
enrollment prior to FPE and this became even stronger over time. Before FPE,
every additional unit of log-food expenditure increased the probability of enroll-
ment in private school by about 0.09%. Following FPE, this increased to nearly
4%. Similarly, following FPE, each additional year of schooling of the household
head increased the probability of enrollment in private school by 1.3%.
4The parameter vector f^ ; ^ 1; ^ 0;g is obtained as follows:  and 1 are generated by
estimating the discrete choice model in (5). 0 and  are the solutions to the non-linear
system of equations formed by (6) and (7), which can be found using numerical methods.
5The marginal eects of the interaction terms from this discrete choice model, as well as
their standard errors, are calculated using the procedures discussed in Chunrong Ai & Edward
Norton (2003), Edward Norton (2004), Thomas DeLeire (2004), and Thomas Cornelissen &
Katja Sonderhof (2009).
18Table 3: Enrollment: Multinomial Logit for School Sector Choice
Prim. Sec.
Government:
Head's Educ 0.0082* -0.0052
(0.0048) (0.0074)
Head's Educ  FPE -0.0128*** -0.0100
(0.0041) (0.0098)
Log Food 0.0120 -0.0813***
(0.0108) (0.0261)
Log Food  FPE -0.0466*** 0.0125
(0.0134) (0.0283)
Private:
Head's Educ 0.0024*** 0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0006)
Head's Educ  FPE 0.0112*** 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0001)
Log Food 0.0088*** 0.0000
(0.0024) (0.0002)
Log Food  FPE 0.0399*** -0.0005
(0.0051) (0.0013)
Observations 69513 41466
Figures in the table are marginal eects from (5). Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
The three choice options are \not enrolled", \government" and \private". \Not enrolled" is
the base-category. District-sector-time dummies are included but not shown.
19It is also instructive to use the underlying multinomial coecients (not reported
in the table) for a direct comparison of how the probability of enrolling in private
school relative to public school has changed since FPE. Prior to FPE, one extra
year of household head education increased the probability of enrolling in private
school relative to the probability of enrolling in public school by 11%. Following
FPE, the magnitude of this eect doubled to 22%.
For comparison purposes, we repeat the analysis for secondary schools. If the
changes in student composition in the primary sector are in fact due to FPE,
then we should not see any similar eects in secondary school. This is indeed
the case, as can be seen from column (2) of Table (3), consistent with the
patterns observed in the summary statistics in Table (1). The interactions of
FPE with socio-economic characteristics are not signicant in secondary schools.
This failure to nd the same systematic pattern of enrollment shifts { of poorer
households into government schools and richer households into private schools {
provides additional condence that the eects we observe in the primary sector
are indeed due to the abolition of school fees in public primary schools rather
than an artefact of secular trends independent of the FPE policy.
In sum, the results from estimating the multinomial choice model conrm the
descriptive statistics: FPE had a positive eect on equalizing access to gov-
ernment schools as evinced by a negative association between socio-economic
background and public enrollment (relative to not enrolling). However, the ed-
ucation system became more stratied following the abolition of fees, as better
o households exited to the private sector, which increasingly became a preserve
of the auent.
We now move on to the core of the estimation: controlling for local interactions
in the decision to enrol in public or private school. The results from estimating
(7) are found in Table (4). The dependent variable is formed by the vector of
predicted sector-district-time xed eects which were estimated as part of the
discrete choice model in the previous step. These measure the average value of
being enrolled in government or private school in a district before and after FPE
controlling for idiosyncratic variation in enrollment choices. We regress the xed
eects on end of primary leaving exam scores, the share of pupils choosing the
same school type, and a set of dummies for government and private school as
well as their respective interactions with an FPE dummy. The table reports the
marginal eects of a change in these regressors on the probability of enrollment.
As anticipated, schools with higher test scores attract more students and {
after instrumenting the  variable { we nd negative local spillover eects,
i.e., the share of pupils from less educated households choosing school type


















The table reports estimates of Equation (4), the second step of the Bayer-Timmins procedure.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the district-sector-time
xed eect from the conditional logit in Table (3). 
m
j is the instrumented share of pupils
from less educated households choosing school type j in market m, and KCPE is the average
exam score for schools of type j in market m. Intercepts included, but not reported.
j has a negative eect on the probability of an additional pupil choosing j.6
Unsurprisingly, this eect is much stronger in public schools than in private
schools.
Having estimated the local spillover eects consistently, we calculate to what
extent social interactions can explain the shifts in enrollment observed in the
wake of FPE. The 25% least educated in our sample increased their enrollment
in public school by 4.5% during the period. Given the coecient on  in
government schools, this implies a decrease in enrollment of almost 7%. Note
that this implied eect is larger than the 6.1% increased in private primary
6Since this is a non-linear IV problem, it is not possible to separate out the rst and second-
stage. The coecients used to predict the enrollment shares include all coecients in Table
3 as well as those in Table 4, with the exception of the coecient on  itself.
21school enrollment documented in Table 1. Thus our estimates imply that social-
interaction eects more than explain the shift in the demand toward private
primary education in Kenya in the wake of FPE.7
To summarise, basic summary statistics show that the net enrollment rate for
government primary schools stagnated under FPE. In this section we have shown
that the failure of a price decrease to stimulate a demand increase is related
to the change in the composition of peers in public schools. While we have
not addressed other channels directly in this section, we note that this social-
interaction eect is suciently strong to explain the seemingly counter-intuitive
enrollment patterns observed after the abolition of school fees { without positing
any decline in underlying school value added.
6 Conclusion
The rst central nding of this paper is that the abolition of user fees for
government primary schools in Kenya in 2003 did not signicantly increase
net enrollment in public schools. Comparing public and private schools at the
primary and secondary level, before and after the Free Primary Education reform,
we nd that the abolition of user fees shifted demand toward private schooling,
evinced by a simultaneous surge in private primary-school enrollment and fee
levels.
In attempting to explain this unanticipated demand response, we show that
public primary-school funding did not decline in the wake of FPE. The loss
in fee revenue to public schools was more than oset by central government
capitation grants.
What did change in response to FPE was the socio-economic composition of
pupils in public schools. FPE was successful in improving access to education for
pupils from poorer households. In contrast, more auent households became
more likely to send their children to private primary schools, leading to increased
socio-economic segregation within the school system.
7Note that the marginal eect of FPE on public school enrollment remains negative in
Table 4 after controlling for social interactions. Although occasionally advocated in an earlier
literature on mediation in causal chains (Reuben M. Baron & David A. Kennedy 1986), it is
inappropriate to gauge the degree to which social interactions mediate the eect of FPE by
their ability to `knock out' the latter variable from this regression, particularly in an IV context
(Donald P. Green, Shang E. Ha & John G. Bullock 2010, Kosuke Imai, Luke Keele, Dustin
Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto 2011).
22The core econometric results in Section 5 show that social interaction eects
are suciently strong to reconcile the aggregate enrollment patterns observed
after a national policy reform with the downward-sloping demand curves found
in earlier partial equilibrium analyses. That is, if we net out the change in public
school pupil composition, we see that FPE did in fact increase eective demand
for public schooling.
Our results suggest that social interactions may be an important source of
general equilibrium eects from price reforms in the education system. Policies
intended to promote equal access to primary schooling can have unintended
consequences, as more auent households attempt to disassociate themselves
from marginal entrants responding to the price reform.
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